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INTRODUCTION

In evaluating a commercial opportunity in the USSR, one must consider three fundamental areas. First, how do the overall economic, political, social, and cultural conditions in the USSR form the background
and influence the type of commercial transaction that can be accomplished? Second, how does one "balance" the benefits and risks, the positive and negative factors in evaluating specific transactions, against the
backdrop of the foreign trade and investment "record" to date? Third,
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how do companies actually complete and implement transactions?
II.

THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND LEGAL
CONTEXTS

A. Lack of Direction in the Soviet Economy Amidst Continued
Deterioration
The direction of economic reform has been unclear and the pace of
reform uncertain. All agree that the old system of centralized planning
has failed and that reforms are necessary. However, the debate over how
to reform the economy has raged for months with no clear resolution in
sight and reforms to date have been poorly developed and inconsistent.
Republic and local initiatives continue to clash with central directives,
resulting in paralysis.
1. Failure of Early Efforts
From March 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet
leader, until the end of 1989, the Soviet approach to economic reform
focused on attempts to impose greater discipline, to exhort workers to
greater productivity and efficiency, to reorganize and eliminate large
inefficient Ministries, to replace and relocate personnel, and to experiment with decentralization of decisionmaking. By the end of 1989, it was
clear that these efforts had failed and that the Soviet economy was deteriorating at an alarming pace.
2.

The Economic Compromise of 1989

In late 1989, Prime Minister Ryzhkov announced a new six-year
plan, which represented a political compromise between the more aggressive economic reformers who favored acceleration towards a more
market-oriented economy and those who were worried about the dislocations that would be created by price reform and decentralized economic
decisionmaking.
The Ryzhkov Plan (the Plan) contemplated a continued role for centralized economic planning through 1992, with a gradual transition to a
more market-oriented economy over the next three years. The Plan also
called for a substantial reallocation of resources from the defense sector
to the consumer products sector.
The Plan sent mixed signals to foreign companies. The Soviets continued to promote investment opportunities through joint ventures, but the
Plan created certain disincentives for foreign companies. Foreign exchange allocations from the state budget for the purchase of imported
goods were to be reduced, and the emphasis of Soviet foreign trade policy
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was to be on the export of finished goods, a sector of the Soviet economy
that has performed poorly on world markets. Soviet financial policy
would emphasize reduction in foreign indebtedness rather than the use of
foreign credits to purchase additional Western goods and technology. In
direct conflict with the trend toward economic decentralization between
1987 and 1989, the Ryzhkov Plan also imposed new restrictions on the
use of foreign exchange earned by Soviet organizations.
3.

Another "Push" Toward Dramatic Reform

In the spring of 1990, the Soviets announced their intention to implement drastic market-oriented reforms, including price reforms, the abolition of the industrial Ministries, and the introduction of new laws on
land use, banking, antitrust, and entrepreneurship. The new reform
package, in Mr. Gorbachev's words, would lead the USSR toward a
"full-blooded market economy." These new measures were scheduled to
be implemented by July 1, 1990 and, had they been implemented, would
have marked a dramatic departure from the Ryzhkov Plan. However,
within 60 days after the announcement of these reforms, the leadership
hesitated, largely because of public outcry over the proposal to raise the
prices of basic foodstuffs, such as bread, which have always been heavily
subsidized. Mr. Gorbachev declared that such dramatic reforms could
not be implemented without having in place an appropriate system of
welfare to counter the adverse consequences of the reforms, e.g., unemployment and price increases. Notwithstanding his pledge to move the
USSR rapidly toward a market economy, Mr. Gorbachev promised the
Soviet people that "shock therapy" would not be applied.
Since virtually all Soviet and Western economic analysts believe that
genuine economic reform is impossible without "shock therapy," Mr.
Gorbachev's unwillingness to suffer the political consequences of such
dramatic and decisive economic policies has been particularly disappointing. It is precisely this indecisiveness, which continues to date, that
has formed the basis for the harshest criticism of Mr. Gorbachev in the
USSR.
4.

The Rise and Fall of the Shatalin (or the "500 Days") Plan

By the early fall of 1990, Stanislav Shatalin, who headed a special
committee of economic advisors to President Gorbachev, had developed a
radical plan to "push" the Soviet Union toward a market-oriented economy. The Shatalin Plan contemplated a dramatic decentralization of the
Soviet economy and the abolition of central planning. Prices and wages
would be set by market forces. Government enterprises and farms would
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be privatized. The republics would be given broad authority to manage
their own economic affairs, although the Plan contemplated a common
currency and unified tax and fiscal policies, which would be developed
by the republics on a consensual basis rather than be imposed on them
by the central authorities. Shatalin's Plan contemplated that the Soviet
Union would have a market economy within five hundred days after
commencing the Plan. From September through October 1990, the merits of the Shatalin Plan and Prime Minister Ryzhkov's more cautious
approach, which was modeled after his former plan that was announced
at the end of 1989, were debated in the Soviet press and among the
Soviet leadership. Boris Yeltsin, who, in May 1990, had become the
head of the Russian Republic, embraced the Shatalin Plan, and the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet overwhelmingly approved the Plan, ordering its implementation by November 1, 1990. President Gorbachev waffled, leaning first toward the more conservative Ryzhkov approach before
finally announcing that he had decided to support the Shatalin Plan, but
also intended to include some of the features of Ryzhkov's version.
5.

The "Gorbachev Plan" for Reform

In November 1990, Mr. Gorbachev issued his version of the new economic plan. While representing a commitment to move the USSR toward a market economy, Mr. Gorbachev's effort to "combine" the
Shatalin and Ryzhkov approach (an effort denounced by Boris Yeltsin as
an attempt "to mate a hedgehog and a snake") resulted in a very general
outline of principles. Entitled "Basic Guidelines for the Stabilization of
the National Economy and Transition to a Market Economy,"
Gorbachev's approach contained few details and no deadlines. To date,
its implementation has been limited to "stabilization" functions, with little progress being made on the "transition" aspects.
In early April 1991, many prices for basic foodstuffs and other items
were raised dramatically, and halting steps have been taken to establish
more realistic exchange rates through the establishment of a currency
market that may, in time, lay the basis for limited rouble convertibility.
6.

Confusion, Discouragement, and Anger

Mr. Gorbachev's program of perestroika (or "restructuring") of the
Soviet economy has failed to bring about fundamental reform. His own
hesitancy in selecting a direction for economic reform and his indecisiveness in implementing a program have embittered and angered Soviet citizens. As the Soviet economy (and with it the standard of living of Soviet
citizens) has declined markedly in the last five years to the point where

330

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

lVol. 24:325

the Soviet authorities have openly solicited food and other forms of aid
from the West, Mr. Gorbachev's standing and authority have also declined. The failure of the economy has become a rallying cry for conservative, anti-reformist forces, which are gaining influence.
B.

Politicaland Social Instability

It is difficult to overstate the impact of the continuing political and
social turmoil in the USSR on short-term foreign investment and trade
prospects.
1. The End of the Empire
The Soviets have lost their dominance over Eastern Europe, and several republics (most notably the Baltic States, but also Georgia, Armenia, and Moldavia) have indicated their desire to secede from the USSR.
All republics have declared that their laws take precedence over laws
issued by the central (or All-Union) authorities, and Mr. Gorbachev has
responded by declaring all such declarations illegal. What has been to
date an intense political struggle appears to be evolving into more serious
confrontation, as the central authorities have begun dispatching military
and KGB forces to the republics to counter the forces of "separatism."
Mr. Gorbachev seems determined to hold the USSR together and appears to be willing to use force to do so.
The most significant consequence of the tensions between the central
authorities and the republics has been uncertainty over whether the
"center" or the republic controls key Soviet assets, most notably natural
resources, located in that republic. This problem is best illustrated by the
now infamous "DeBeers case," in which the central authorities granted
DeBeers an exclusive to distribute diamonds located in the Yakutia region of the Russian Republic. Russia declared the transaction illegal because republic level authorities had not approved it. Shortly thereafter,
Yakutia, in an exercise of local "muscle-flexing," declared that only
it-neither the "center" nor the Russian Republic-had the right to sell
those diamonds.
2.

Nationalities Problems

At the heart of many republic-level movements for independence are
the traditional nationalities problems that the Soviet Union has faced. In
a country of more than one hundred nationalities, many of which have
faced brutal repression of their national cultures at the hands of their
Soviet "masters," particularly during the reign of Stalin, Mr.
Gorbachev's policies of democratization and glasnost have given vent to

1991]

BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION

long-suppressed desires for independence, as is evident in the Baltic
states and Moldavia. Another consequence of his policies has been the
resurgence of historical ethnic strife, best illustrated by the ArmenianAzerbaijani conflict.
3.

Mr. Gorbachev's Status

Mr. Gorbachev has accumulated vast power in his position as President of the Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviet has virtually ceded its
legislative authority to him on matters relating to the economy. He has
issued a variety of decrees, largely intended to "stabilize" rather than to
reform the economy under his new "emergency" legislative power, giving
rise to fears that the conservative forces in the USSR are exercising
greater influence over his decisionmaking. He has imposed two major
reorganizations of the Soviet Government in three years, and more structural uncertainty is likely until the fundamental questions of authority
between the republics and the central authorities are resolved. As conservative forces have gained more prominence, they have been more
boldly critical of Mr. Gorbachev. Since he has lost the support of the
democratic reformers, he appears increasingly isolated; a man without a
constituency.
4.

Growth in Crime

Both violent crime and organized crime have increased significantly
amidst the economic chaos and breakdown of authority. There is growing concern over the authorities' ability to impose law and order, and it
appears likely that military force may be used against the rising wave of
crime. While conservative forces oppose cooperatives because of their alleged economic crimes, i.e., "speculation and profiteering," it is increasingly evident that a significant percentage of cooperative activity does
involve criminal elements. Unfortunately, these elements have tainted the
cooperative movement which, in its inception, represented one of the best
opportunities for economic reform in the USSR.
5. The Role of the Communist Party
Among the most dramatic developments during Mr. Gorbachev's tenure was the Communist Party's decision in February 1990 to relinquish
its monopoly over political power in the USSR. While this decision has
laid the groundwork for the development of a multi-party system, the
effective organization of new national political parties has developed
slowly. Because the Communist Party has largely retained its infrastructure, which had enabled it to permeate every level of Soviet society, its
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influence continues and may even grow stronger as conservative forces
reassert themselves.
6.

The Limits of Democracy

Mr. Gorbachev's greatest contribution to the Soviet Union to date has
been his policies of democratization and glasnost, which mark a dramatic departure from centuries of a Russia that was characterized by
autocratic rule and was virtually closed-off from, and inaccessible to, foreigners. In 1989, the Soviet Union held free elections and the Congress
of People's Deputies and its primary legislative arm, the Supreme Soviet,
have been developing into democratic institutions. Progress is -mixed,
however, and much concern has been expressed over the inability of
"radical reformers" to develop and obtain broader support for economic
and political reforms. Mr. Gorbachev's vast power to legislate by personal decree has also undermined the influence of these new democratic
institutions.
C.

Cultural Constraints

Certain Soviet, particularly Russian, cultural attributes limit the development of a more Western-oriented "business culture" in the USSR
and inhibit commercial transactions.
1. The Impact of Fear
Fear both of the consequences of a bad decision and of taking actions
not specifically authorized continues to make many Soviet negotiators
(particularly more experienced negotiators in federal-level Ministries
and foreign trade organizations) risk averse, which stifles creativity in
problem-solving and often results in sound proposals being crushed
under the weight of the multi-layered Soviet bureaucracy. Many times in
negotiations, Soviet officials have reacted to business proppsals made by
our clients by acknowledging the soundness of a proposal, but refusing to
agree because they "did not want to be the first to try it."
2.

The Resentment of "Profit"

Russians often display a deep suspicion of what Westerners would
regard as normal profit-making activity, particularly in the distribution
of goods from producer to wholesaler, to retailer and, finally, to customer. Normal "mark-ups" are perceived as "speculating" and "profiteering." Such resentment explains more than any other factor the
stunted growth of the Soviet "private" sector, best exemplified by the
cooperatives. As soon as cooperatives began achieving success, harsh
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taxes and many restrictions were imposed. Soviet law even prohibits the
importing by joint ventures and other organizations of finished goods for
resale in the Soviet economy, unless special governmental approvals are
obtained.
3.

Pervasive Secrecy

Centuries of dictatorship have not fostered openness, and Soviet policy
and administrative directives are often shrouded in secrecy. Even basic
rules, such as export quotas, customs rates and key components of the
taxation system, have not been published. Basic financial and commercial
information about Soviet organizations is unavailable.
4.

Sense of Responsibility

The totalitarian nature of the Soviet system and the pervasiveness of
state control over individuals have severely repressed individual initiative
and responsibility. Soviets must learn to be risktakers to- succeed in a
more market-oriented economy. A basic work ethic and rewards for performance have been severely lacking.
D. Improvement in United States-Soviet Relations
1. End of the Cold War
United States-Soviet relations are better than at any time in the last
forty-five years, which is best indicated by the widespread belief following the Malta summit in December 1989 that the Cold War is over. The
close relationship forged between Secretary of State James Baker and
former Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze also served to personalize
and enhance relations between the two countries.
2.

Commercial Breakthroughs

A few months ago, it appeared likely that the Soviets would receive
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status as part of a new overall United
States-Soviet Trade Agreement, perhaps as early as the end of the first
quarter of 1991. Despite President Bush's insistence on the codification
of new, more liberal emigration laws before sending the new United
States-Soviet Trade Agreement to the Senate for ratification, he granted
a limited waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to permit the extension of credits to the USSR for the purchase of United States grain. The
new Trade Agreement contains important new rights for United States
companies operating in the USSR, including the right to hire Soviet employees directly and to pay them in freely convertible currency. How-
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ever, the crackdown in the Baltics, the growing prominence of the Army,
the Communist Party and the KGB (coupled with their anti-Western,
xenophobic rhetoric) and alleged breaches by the Soviets of arms control
understandings may significantly delay United States Senate ratification
of the Trade Agreement.
3.

Positive Perception of Americans

Soviet negotiators are no longer preoccupied with whether United
States companies will be reliable partners. In fact, Soviets are often quite
comfortable dealing with United States business partners and have begun to look to the West to learn more about business transactions.
III.

EVALUATING THE COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT

The decision whether to enter into a commercial transaction in the
USSR, particularly a significant investment through a joint venture, involves a balancing of positive and negative factors and a thorough assessment of risks and benefits.
A.

Some Joint Venture Success, but Problemsfrom Poor Planning

There are currently almost 3500 joint ventures registered in the
USSR, which represents a significant accomplishment, since the joint
venture law has only been in existence for four years. However, less than
ten percent of those ventures are actually operating, and the amount of
foreign investment in each venture has been decreasing and is now less
than one million United States dollars. Actual cash investment averages
less than 115,000 United States dollars per joint venture.
Too many joint ventures are entered into without careful consideration
and planning; it is indeed possible-and to some extent encouraged by
Soviet partners who see political and economic benefits for themselves in
participating in joint ventures-to form a joint venture without clearly
identifying the business to be conducted or how such business will be
operated. Often only after a joint venture entity is formed do the parties
begin to consider how to operate the business. It is not until this point
that it is discovered that the Soviet partner may not be in a position to
perform its obligations, whether such obligations consist of providing office space, arranging local supplies, obtaining certain approvals, or arranging to make available countertrade items to provide some form of
usable return for the foreign investor. In an economy in which it is extremely difficult to obtain profits in freely convertible currency and to
obtain basic supplies, forming a joint venture without care and thorough
due diligence is a prescription for disaster.
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Joint ventures have been predominantly in the services sector. Foreign
investors have tended to be mostly small, more entrepreneurial; however,
there are notable exceptions. Many large Western companies, such as
Combustion Engineering, Honeywell, McDonalds, Pizza Hut, Dresser
Industries, Tambrands, Baskin-Robbins, Lubrizol, Otis Elevators, and
Young & Rubicam, have seen joint ventures as opportunities either to
establish themselves as new entrants to the Soviet market or to build
their existing Soviet businesses.
The above-mentioned factors, plus a growing feeling in the USSR that
current foreign investment policy has yielded little direct benefit for the
Soviet people, resulted in a reassessment of joint ventures and foreign
investment laws and policy during 1990. The immediate result was a
dramatic slowdown in the number of joint ventures registered by the
USSR Ministry of Finance. At the height of joint venture registrations
in mid-1 989, approximately ten joint ventures per day were being registered; by the end of April 1990, that number had fallen to between three
and four per week. Registrations accelerated at the end of 1990 as the
USSR Ministry of Finance cleared its backlog before turning over the
registration function to the Republic-level Ministries of Finance, effective January 1, 1991. The USSR Supreme Soviet is considering a new
foreign investment code, which may be adopted during 1991.
B. PromisingMarket Opportunities, but the Problems of a Lack of
Convertible Currency and Poor InfrastructureMake Access Difficult
The Soviet Union is one of the last large, untapped markets in the
world and is characterized by an insatiable demand for Western goods.
Obtaining convertible currency, however, continues to be the greatest
hurdle to doing business in the USSR. Countertrade has not proved thus
far to be very successful. Commodities (not the very "liquid" and valuable commodities such as furs, gold, diamonds, or oil and gas) are limited,
and there is intense competition for what is available. Furthermore, restrictions on exports and licensing requirements have made such transactions even more difficult.
Other means of earning foreign exchange, such as selling under currency clearing arrangements through India, Turkey, Egypt, and other
Third World countries or in "compensation trade" transactions (earning
foreign exchange by assisting the Soviets in an activity that generates
foreign exchange, the proceeds of which are then shared with the foreign
partner to purchase its products for distribution in the Soviet economy)
have been difficult to arrange and involve a significant commitment of
time and money.
Soviet authorities have refused to use foreign exchange reserves or to
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provide any assurance of foreign exchange repatriation (beyond the joint
venture's own earnings) even to meet critical domestic priorities. Even in
"import substitution" projects (where foreign investment in production
would reduce or eliminate Soviet foreign exchange expenditures to import the product), Soviet authorities have refused to "set aside" a portion
of the foreign exchange savings to provide a fund that would permit the
foreign partner to convert rouble profits into foreign exchange.
0.

New Participantsin Foreign Trade Offer Opportunities, but also
Much Chaos and Uncertainty

Soviet economic reform has created new opportunities to do business
and to deal directly with Soviet Republics, Soviet enterprises, and privately owned cooperatives. The availability, however, of new partners
has created great confusion. Many "new partners" have almost no foreign trade experience, and it is almost impossible to acquire any information about such entities. Basic information about assets, financial performance, commercial experience, and other similar types of information
remain state secrets or are otherwise unavailable because of poor recordkeeping practices.
After decades of central control over foreign trade, Soviet authorities
have "stepped back" too dramatically. There is little coherence in Soviet
foreign trade policy, no clear identification of priorities and little support
for Soviet organizations, which are only beginning to understand foreign
commercial transactions.
The general failure of Soviet foreign investment policy since 1987 is
directly attributable to the failure of the central authorities to identify
priorities for investment in key sectors of the Soviet economy, such as
natural resources, agricultural and food supply, medical services, and
support projects falling within those priorities. Despite expectations and
pronouncements from the Soviet authorities regarding their desire to use
foreign trade to upgrade Soviet manufacturing capabilities, improve Soviet technological performance and earn foreign exchange, Soviet foreign
trade policy has, in fact, lacked coordination and direction. This failure
to set priorities and work toward achieving them is linked to the historic
failure of the Soviet system to develop coherent and effective policies to
integrate foreign trade and, more recently, foreign investment into the
Soviet economy.
This lack of coordination has been particularly damaging to major foreign investment opportunities. The central authorities have failed to coordinate legal, financial, and tax policies to create an environment supportive of foreign investment. Soviet lawmakers have not enacted
adequate legislation to develop a legal infrastructure to support commer-
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cial financing, such as a mortgage law or even clear laws on ownership
and use of assets. Indeed, Soviet authorities have not effectively used the
centrally controlled banking system to promote foreign investment. For
example, the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs (or "Vneshekonombank") has been unwilling to participate significantly in joint venture financing. This has been a key reason for the slowdown of major
investment in the large natural resource projects, because Western banks
and financial institutions have resisted providing capital in high-risk ventures without Soviet state (or "sovereign") guarantees.
Along the same lines, the USSR Ministry of Finance has developed its
own tax and joint venture registration policies, which conflict with published joint venture decrees and regulations in many cases. This practice
raises the prospect that, since joint venture registration is now being handled at the republic level, each Republic's Ministry of Finance may develop its own registration procedures. Moreover, new legislation in 1988
required the USSR Customs authorities to develop and publish rules to
facilitate the importation of goods for use in connection with joint ventures. Not until April 1991 was a Customs law published.
It is no longer advisable to sell "on open account" (unsecured basis) to
Soviet organizations. Significant payment problems have emerged. Soviet
foreign trade organizations are past due on between two and three billion dollars. The use of letters of credit or bank guarantees has become
important to protect foreign sellers.
The infrastructure problems in the USSR are tremendous. Housing
and office space for foreigners are in short supply and subject to long
waiting lists. Communications systems are very poor in quality and extremely expensive. The charge for merely installing a direct-dial long
distance telephone line can be as high as twenty thousand United States
dollars.
D. The Joint Venture Law Offers Flexibility, but Lack of Business
Culture Limits its Scope
The Soviet joint venture legislation permits the parties much flexibility in "working out" the best means (i) to operate their joint enterprise,
including management appointments and decision-making, valuing and
structuring capital contributions and seeking financing and (ii) to structure the legal documents embodying their business arrangements. Despite the current chaos in the Soviet system, the joint venture law itself,
which now comprises more than twenty-five separate decrees, regulations
and instructions, has provided a relatively stable legal basis for foreign
investment in the Soviet Union.
The fundamental problems of investment in the Soviet Union are po-
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litical and economic, not legal. The joint venture law has afforded parties a reasonable degree of flexibility in arranging their commercial affairs and has basically offered adequate legal protection to foreign
investors. These laws have not been without their problems, but compared with the early joint venture laws of China and Eastern Europe,
the initial Soviet joint venture legislation has been far more effective.
In the USSR, there is no business culture, as we in the West understand that concept. Soviets do not understand how to negotiate, document, or manage a transaction in accordance with Western standards,
making it extremely difficult to finalize and properly document a transaction. Ironically, the lack of a business culture makes the legal documentation even more important, because the lack of commercial understanding between the parties means that the documents will be the key
(and perhaps only) source of that understanding and, therefore, should
be even more detailed and explicit than would be the case in Western
transactions.

E. Soviet Concessions Are More Difficult to Obtain than is
Commonly Believed
There is a widespread belief that it is possible to receive special benefits from the Soviets if the Western company is particularly favored by
Soviet authorities. Pepsi-Cola, with its "cola concentrate for vodka" deal,
and Occidental Petroleum, with the late Armand Hammer's long history
of Soviet transactions, are often named as examples of this favoritism. In
today's joint venture environment, it is widely rumored that the USSR
Ministry of Finance will readily grant extensions of the two-year income
tax holiday for joint ventures or that, even more aggressively, whatever
the Soviet and foreign partners agree in their joint venture documents
will somehow be "binding" on Soviet authorities, especially tax
authorities.
There is, however, much misinformation on this issue. In fact, the
Ministry of Finance through its tax department has strongly resisted the
granting of extensions to the tax holiday provisions of the joint venture
law and that same Ministry, through its joint venture registration department, has applied greater and greater scrutiny to joint venture documents. In registering joint ventures, the Ministry often has applied its
own "unpublished" standards and will often require deletions of items to
which the parties have agreed in their joint venture documents.
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F. Deal Structures and Problems
Despite the difficulties identified above, transactions are being accomplished. On the joint venture side, companies such as McDonalds, Combustion Engineering, Honeywell, Dresser Industries, Young & Rubicam,
Baskin-Robbins, and Tambrands have begun operating joint ventures in
the Soviet Union. Others such as Fiat have announced their intention to
form joint ventures, and many other major Western companies are seriously considering possibilities. The consortium structure, best exemplified by the American Trade Consortium consisting of Johnson & Johnson, Chevron, RJR Nabisco, Archer Daniels Midland, and Eastman
Kodak; and the American Medical Consortium, consisting of Hospital
Corporation International, Abbott Laboratories, Hewlett Packard, Colgate Palmolive, Medical Service Partners, and Pfizer International, is
becoming more popular. The consortium structure offers a means to focus and coordinate efforts, to defray high costs of arranging transactions
and, perhaps, to provide a coordinated solution to the problem of rouble
convertibility.
1. Natural Resource ("Compensation Trade") Projects
The best projects in theory should be those that combine a Soviet natural resource in abundance (oil, gas, timber, etc.) with Western technology to produce a product (petrochemicals, finished wood) that is readily
saleable on international markets. Such projects upgrade Soviet production capabilities by adding Western technology which, in turn, produce
products that enable the Soviets to earn more foreign exchange. The
problem of how to obtain a return in foreign exchange for the foreign
partner is solved because the foreign partner shares in the proceeds of
the export sales.
Few projects have succeeded, and there have been many problems in
getting these projects underway. First, there have disputes between central, republic, and local authorities over who controls the natural resources. Second, there has been uncertainty created by government reorganization and the inability or unwillingness of senior Soviet officials to
decide to proceed with large projects. Third, there has been a lack of
focus and priority from Soviet authorities. Fourth, Soviet authorities
have been unwilling to provide appropriate financial and performance
guarantees to support financing. Fifth, there have been growing, more
vocal environmental concerns expressed by the Soviets, especially at local
levels relating to resource development.
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"Captive" Foreign Exchange Projects

Best known among these projects, which draw on the foreign exchange
of tourists, business travellers, and foreign residents in Moscow, are hotels, office buildings, and related real estate projects, as well as service
ventures focused on those groups. Despite the glaring need for housing,
office space, and hotel accommodations in Moscow, only a few "office
building" joint ventures and hotel joint ventures are operating. Other
hotel projects have been announced, but are not yet operational.
Problems in launching these projects have included bureaucratic
problems with Moscow authorities in obtaining approvals and sites; obtaining financing; obtaining control over operations for the foreign investor; and the difficulty of identifying credible and competent partners.
3.

Rouble Earning and Countertrade Projects

Tambrands' joint ventures to produce feminine hygiene products are
the best known of these projects, which are geared to the Soviet domestic
market. Rouble profits are used to acquire Soviet commodities for export.
In the Tambrands projects, the Ministry of Health has arranged an allocation of cotton for Tambrands, which has provided a source of foreign
exchange. Tambrands' most successful joint venture to date is in the
Ukraine, illustrating the positive side of working directly with Soviet
republics.
There also have been several problems in launching these projects.
First, there has been difficulty in arranging and securing appropriate
countertrade. The status of the Soviet rouble, which is not readily "convertible" domestically into goods and services, causes difficulty because
great shortages and planned allocations limit severely the availability of
such goods and services. Second, the Soviets have failed to clarify their
priorities for Western investors. Third, there is a new restrictive, rapidly
expanding export licensing system, certain restrictions of which have not
even been published.
The much publicized McDonalds restaurant project falls into this category. Despite opening a restaurant for roubles on Pushkin Square in
Moscow, McDonalds must solve its own foreign exchange problem, perhaps by opening restaurants for foreign exchange, by selling extra food
they produce to restaurants, or by constructing an office building to lease
to foreign companies. McDonalds has also reportedly spent between fifty
and sixty million dollars to construct its own food processing facilities
and fourteen years of effort to open the Pushkin Square restaurant, illustrating vividly the time and expense necessary to gain a foothold.
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4. New Laws
The new USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a number of new laws
affecting foreign investors. For example, new real estate laws provide
new legal bases for real estate and other leasing transactions, and new
tax legislation has completely reoriented the Soviet personal and corporate tax systems. As one might expect, there remain many problems in
interpreting and applying these new laws and reconciling differences and
conflicts in such laws. The promulgation of new banking and currency,
labor, antitrust, and environmental laws in recent months underscore the
rapid developments of the Soviet legal system.
IV.

PROBLEMS IN COMPLETING AND IMPLEMENTING COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS IN THE

USSR

Companies that secure commercial opportunities in the USSR must
face time-consuming and expensive problems in negotiating, documenting, and implementing these transactions. While Mr. Gorbachev
speaks about the need for a society governed by the rule of law, the
USSR is more like our understanding of the "ways things work" in less
developed countries in the sense that the rules of power and relationships
override the rule of law in commercial transactions.
A.

Role of a Partner

In a joint commercial undertaking, the quality of one's partner is an
important factor in the success of the project. In the USSR, it is undoubtedly the key factor. Often, Western business people interpret this to
mean that they must obtain high-level political support to make progress
on their projects. While such support is important, and the most successful strategies involve pushing from the top and the bottom (in order to
cut through the encrusted, petrified middle level of bureaucrats), "highlevel political support" can only be used sparingly and, given the current
social and economic crisis, Soviet leaders have very limited time for specific (even large and important) projects.
Therefore, there is no substitute in the current environment for an
effective Soviet partner who understands how to get things done and is
committed to the projects being undertaken.
B. A "No Can Do" JurisprudentialAttitude
Another fundamental problem from a legal point of view is an approach by Soviets that is foreign to most Westerners. The Soviets approach legal questions with the deeply held belief that if an action is not
specifically permitted, it is prohibited. This perspective sharply contrasts
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with the Western perspective that if an action is not specifically prohibited, it is permitted.
This Soviet perspective explains, in part, the Soviet desire to "push"
joint ventures on foreign companies and Soviet resistance to simpler,
more efficient and logical structures. The joint venture law is, from the
Soviet perspective, an "authorized," politically acceptable means of conducting economic relations with foreigners. This perspective also underscores the conservative, risk-averse nature of Soviet negotiators; a vestige
of their totalitarian history in which they believe a mistake might not
simply close a career opportunity, it might cost you your life.
C.

Secret, Unavailable Laws

Another problem can generally be described as the difficulty of finding
the laws or knowing what the rules are. Despite the reforms of glasnost
and perestroika, published laws are scarce, many rules remain state
secrets, and most Ministerial policies and rules consist only in the form
of internal directives.
There are a wide variety of Soviet organizations participating in the
legislative process to develop laws and regulations for foreign economic
relations, but no central, authoritative, public source dispenses information about new legal developments. Much Soviet law is either not publicly available or is a state secret. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers frequently decides not to publish its decrees or to publish only portions of
those decrees.
D. Lack of Commercial Legal Experience
The Soviets are not experienced in drafting legislation with precision
and clarity. Therefore, many rules are stated in very general, ambiguou's
language, and terms are used without clear meanings. A recent importexport decree prohibits "intermediary activity" in foreign economic relations without any attempt to define this term. The Soviet joint venture
law itself requires that all "fundamental decisions" of the joint venture
business be made by unanimous vote of the Board. There has been no
attempt to provide guidance as to what constitutes "fundamental
decisions."
E. Approval Processfor Foreign Investment Transactions
One of the most significant areas of problems for foreign investors has
been the approval process for foreign investment transactions. Amidst the
crisis of authority and decentralization of foreign trade, approvals in all
forms have become more difficult to obtain.
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F. Dramatic Changes in the Legal System
It is clear that the Soviet legal system is in transition. As the system
moves from rigid centralization, characterized by internal, administrative
directives from Ministries, to more decentralization of authority for the
enterprises and other business units, the importance of contractual relations will increase and pressure will build to develop clearer, more flexible and publicly available rules to govern commercial conduct.
The USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies
over the next two to three years will be considering legislation that
should completely transform the Soviet legal system, including laws on
property, on ownership, on state enterprises, on corporations and partnerships, on freedom of speech and conscience and on political parties.
V.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Essay has been to provide, in somewhat summary
fashion, basic background and guidelines to assist Western companies
that are considering commercial transactions in the Soviet Union. It was
not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of all factors that may affect
the negotiation, completion and implementation of commercial transactions in the Soviet Union. Rather, we have drawn from our experience
in assisting our clients over the last three years in the USSR and have
attempted to provide an appropriate context for the consideration of potential business opportunities.
In our experience, the most effective perspective to adopt in evaluating
commercial opportunities in the Soviet Union is to weigh the risks and
the benefits and, in particular, to appreciate the difficulties in accomplishing a Western-style business transaction amidst extraordinary political, social, economic, and legal turmoil in a culture that is vastly different from our own.
No one knows yet whether recent events in the Soviet Union herald
genuine reform and progress towards a more open, democratic system
and a more market-oriented economy, or mark the destruction of an empire headed, at least in the short term, to chaos and breakdown. Therein
lies the key risk in entering the Soviet market. Foreign companies that
take up the challenge must be courageous, patient, and well-prepared.
Few, if any, such companies will enjoy short-term rewards. Only those
that develop and implement a long-term strategy will effectively secure
themselves a place in the Soviet marketplace of the next generation.

